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Abstract. The paper is a basis for multiagent visual computing with the Morph 
Gentzen logic. A basis to VR computing, computational illusion, and virtual 
ontology is presented.  The IM_BID model is introduced for planning, spatial 
computing, and visual ontology. Visual intelligent objects are applied with 
virtual intelligent trees to carry on visual planning. New KR techniques are 
presented with generic diagrams and appllied to define computable models. 
The IM Morph Gentzen Logic for computing for multimedia are new projects 
with important computing applications. The basic principles are a 
mathematical logic where a Gentzen or natural deduction systems is defined 
by taking arbitrary structures and multimedia objects coded by diagram 
functions.The techniques can be applied to arbitrary structures definable by 
infinitary languages. Multimedia objects are viewed as syntactic objects 
defined by functions, to which the deductive system is applied.   
1. Introduction 
Agent computing models are introduced with an intelligent multimedia 
dimension. An overview to a practical agent computing model based on beliefs, 
intentions, and desire is presented and possible augmentation to intelligent 
multimedia is explored. Genesereth-Nilsson [17]  presents agent architectures as 
follows. Dynamics and situation compatibility in introduced as a structural way to 
compute and compare epistemic states.  Worlds, epistemics, and cognition for 
androids are introduced with precise statements. The foundations are applied to 
present a brief on Computational Illusion, affective computing, and Virtual Reality. 
KR for AI Worlds, and Computable Worlds are presented with diagrams [7].  A 
preview to computational epistemology and concept descriptions is introduced. 
Deduction models and perceptual computing is presented with a new perspective.  
Intelligent multimedia interfaces are an important component to the practical 
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computational aspects. Visual context and objects are presented with multiagent 
intelligent multimedia. Visual context abstraction and meta-contextual reasoning is 
introduced as a new field.  Multiagent visual multi-board planning is introduced as 
a basis to intelligent multimedia with applications to spatial computing.  
2. The Agent Models and Desire  
Let us start with the popular agent computing model the Beliefs, Desire, and 
Intentions, henceforth abbreviated as the BID model (Brazier-Truer et.al.[1,6]. BID 
is a generic agent computing model specified within the declarative compositional 
modeling framework for multi-agent systems, DESIRE.   The model, a refinement 
of a generic agent model, explicitly specifies motivational attitudes and the static 
and dynamic relations between motivational attitudes. Desires, goals, intentions, 
commitments, plans, and their relations are modeled.  Different notions of strong 
and weak agency are presented at (Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995) [3].  (Velde and 
Perram, 1996) [10] distinguished big and small agents.  To apply agent computing 
with intelligent multimedia some specific roles and models have to be presented for 
agents. The BID model has emerged for a “rational agent”: a rational agent 
described using cognitive notions such as beliefs, desires and intentions. Beliefs, 
intentions, and commitments play a crucial role in determining how rational agents 
will act. Beliefs, capabilities, choices, and commitments are the parameters making 
component agents specific. The above are applied to model and to specify mental 
attitudes (Shoham, 1991-1993) [46], Rao and Georgeff, 1991[20], Cohen and 
Levesque, 1990, Dunin-Keplicz and Verbrugge, 1996 . A generic BID agent model 
in the multiagent framework DESIRE is presented towards a specific agent model. 
The main emphasis is on static and dynamic relations between mental attitudes, 
which are of importance for cooperative agents. DESIRE is the framework for 
design, and the specification of interacting reasoning components is a framework 
for modeling, specifying and implementing multi-agent systems, see (Brazier, 
Dunin-Keplicz, Jennings, and Treur, 1995, 1996; Dunin-Keplicz and Treur, 1995). 
Within the framework, complex processes are designed as compositional 
architectures consisting of interacting task-based hierarchically structured 
components. The interaction between components, and between components and 
the external world is explicitly specified. Components can be primitive reasoning 
components using a knowledge base, but may also be subsystems which are capable 
of performing tasks using methods as diverse as decision theory, neural networks, 
and genetic algorithms. As the framework inherently supports interaction between 
components, multi-agent systems are naturally specified in DESIRE by modeling 
agents as components that can be implemented applying author’s 1993-1999.  
2.1 Mental Attitudes 
Agents are assumed to have the four properties required for the weak notion of 
agency described in (Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995). Thus, agents must maintain 
interaction with their environment, for example observing and performing actions in 
the world: reactivity; be able to take the initiative: pro-activeness; be able to 
perform social actions like communication, social ability; operate without the direct 
intervention of other (possibly human) agents: autonomy. Four main categories of 
mental attitudes are studied in the AI literature: informational, motivational, social 
and emotional attitudes. The focus is on motivational attitudes, although other 
aspects are marginally considered. In (Shoham and Cousins, 1994) [43], 
motivational attitudes are partitioned into the following categories: goal, want, 
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desire, preference, wish, choice, intention, commitment, and plan. Individual agents 
are assumed to have intentions and commitments both with respect to goals and 
with respect to plans. A generic classification of an agent's attitudes is defined as 
follows: Informational attitudes: Knowledge; Beliefs. 
1. Motivational attitudes: Desires; Intentions- Intended goals and Intended plans. 
2. Commitments: Committed goals and Committed plans 
In planning, see section 6, the weakest motivational attitude might be desire: 
reflecting yearning, wish and want. An agent may harbor desires which are 
impossible to achieve. Desires may be ordered according to preferences and, as 
modeled in this paper, they are the only motivational attitudes subject to 
inconsistency. At some point an agent must just settle on a limited number of 
intended goals, i.e., chosen desires.  
2.2 Specifying BID Agents 
The BID-architectures upon which specifications for compositional multi-agent 
systems are based are the result of analysis of the tasks performed by individual 
agents and groups of agents. Task (de)compositions include specifications of 
interaction between subtasks at each level within a task (de)composition, making it 
possible to explicitly model tasks which entail interaction between agents. 
The formal compositional framework for modeling multi-agent tasks DESIRE is 
introduced here. The following aspects are modeled and specified: (1)  A task 
(de)composition,(2) information exchange, (3) sequencing of (sub)tasks, (4) subtask 
delegation, (5)  knowledge structures. Information required/produced by a (sub)task 
is defined by input and output signatures of a component.  The signatures used to 
name the information are defined in a predicate logic with a hierarchically ordered 
sort structure (order-sorted predicate logic). Units of information are represented by 
the ground atoms defined in the signature. The role information plays within 
reasoning is indicated by the level of an atom within a signature: different (meta) 
levels may be distinguished. In a two-level situation the lowest level is termed 
object-level information, and the second level meta-level information. Some 
specifics and a mathematical basis to such models with agent signatures might be 
obtained from (Nourani 1996a) [44] where the notion had been introduced since 
1994. Meta-level information contains information about object-level information 
and reasoning processes; for example, for which atoms the values are still unknown 
(epistemic information). The generic model and specifications of an agent described 
above, can be refined to a generic model of a rational BID-agent capable of explicit 
reasoning about its beliefs, desires, goals and commitments.  
3.Epistemitcs  
3.1 Worlds and A Robot's Touch 
Starting with the issues raised by Heidegger in 1935-36, and notion of "What is a 
thing" as put forth in (Heidegger 63). The author’s was presented with such 
challenges to computing applications with philosophical epistemics, while visiting 
INRIA, Paris around 1992. His reaction was to start with "first principles", not 
touching such difficult areas of philosophy and phenomenology, and only present 
views to what they could imply for the metamathematics of AI. However, since the 
author’s techniques were intended for AI computations and reasoning, rather than 
knowledge representation from observations, as it is the case in (Didday 90), 
Heidegger's definitions had to be taken further. The common point of interest is 
symbolic knowledge representation. However, the research directions are two 
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essentially orthogonal, but not contradicting, views to knowledge representation. 
3.2 Computational Illusion and Virtual Reality 
Let us call “der Vielleicht Vorhandenen” objects that are only ‘Perhaps 
Computable,’ and therefore might be a computational illusion. That is the robot’s 
senses are not always real. The important problem is to be able to define worlds 
minimally to have computable representations with mathematical logic thus the 
ability to make definitive statements. Heidegger's Die Frage nach dem Ding will 
prove to be a blessing in disguise. Could it have computing applications to things 
without. Heidegger had defined three sorts of things. 1- Things in the sense of being 
"within reach", des Vorhandenen. 2. Things which "unify" things of the first kind, 
or are reflections on, resolution and actions. 3. Things of kind 1 or 2 and also any 
kind of things which are not nothing. To define logic applicable to planning for 
robots reaching for objects, the der Vielliecht Vorhandenen computational 
linguistics game is defined.  To start, let us explore Heidegger's views of the "des 
Vorhandenen", having to do with what object is within "reach" in a real sense.  In 
AI and computing applications notion of des Vorhandnen is not absolute. As an AI 
world develops the objects that have names in the world are at times des 
Vorhandnen and as defined by a principle of Parsimony only des Vorhandnen in an 
infinitary sense of logic (Nourani 1984,91) [32]. The logical representation for 
reaching the object might be infinitary only. The phenomenological problem from 
the robot's standpoint is to acquire a decidable descriptive computation [30] for the 
problem domain. Thus what is intended to be reached can stay always out of reach 
in a practical sense, unless it is at least what I call der Vielliecht Vorhandenen .  The 
computing issues are the artificial intelligence computation and representation of 
real objects. That is, we can make use of symbolic computation to be able to "get 
at" a real object. At times, however, only infinite computations could define real 
world objects. For example, there is a symbolic computation for an infinite ordinal, 
by an infinite sequence of successor operations on 0. Furthermore, the present 
notion of der Vielliecht Vorhandenen is not intend to be the sense in which a robot 
cannot reach a particular object. The intent is that the language could have names 
for which the corresponding thing is not obvious in the AI world and there is 
incomplete information until at some point the world is defined enough that there is 
a thing corresponding to a name, or that at least there is a thing by comprehension, 
which only then becomes des Vorhandnen as the AI world is further defined or 
rearranged. These issues are examined in the computational context in the sections 
below. For example, the der Vielleicht Vorhandenen game has a winning strategy if 
the world descriptions by generic diagrams define the world enough to have a 
computation sequence to reach for an intended object. This implies there must be a 
decidable descriptive computation (Nourani 1994,96) for the world applied. The 
immediate linguistics example of these concepts from natural languages is a 
German child's language in which to "vor" and "handenen" are some corresponding 
things in the child's language world and mind, but "vorhandenen" is not a thing in 
that child's world and only becomes a thing as the linguistics world is further 
defined for the child.  
3.3 Deduction Models and Perceptual Computing 
Models uphold to a deductive closure of the axioms modeled and some rules of 
inference, depending on the theory. By the definition of a diagram they are a set of 
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atomic and negated atomic sentences. Hence a diagram can be considered as a basis 
for  defining model, provided we can by algebraic extension, define the truth value 
of arbitrary formulas instantiated with arbitrary terms. Thus all compound sentences 
build out of atomic sentences then could be assigned a truth value, handing over a 
model. It might be illuminating to compare the G-diagram techniques and 
computational epistemology to the (Konolige 1984) [24] starting with the 
consequential closure problem for artificial intelligence and the possible worlds. 
What Konolige starts with is the infeasibility premise for consequential closure, i.e. 
the assumption that an agent knows all logical consequences of his beliefs. The 
deductive model is defined for situations where belief derivation is logically 
incomplete. The area had been voiced since (Fodor 75) and (Moore 80). Konolige 
applies a model where beliefs are expressions in the agent’s “mind” and the agent 
reasons about them by manipulating syntactic objects.  When the process of belief 
derivation is logically incomplete, the deduction model does not have the property 
of the consequential closure. Konolige defines a saturated deduction model and 
claims a correspondence property: For every modal logic of belief based on Kripke 
possible world models, there exists a corresponding deduction model logic family 
with an equivalent saturated logic.  The G-diagrams are defined for incomplete KR, 
modalities, and model set correspondence. What computational epistemology 
defines is a model theoretic technique whereby without the consequential closure 
property requirements on agents a model-theoretic completeness can be ascertained 
via nondeterministic diagrams. The author defined specific modal diagrams for 
computational linguistics models [27,29].   
4.AffectiveComputing 
(Picard 1999) [14] assertions indicate not all modules is a designed AI system might 
pay attention to emotions, or to have emotional components. Some modules are 
useful rigid tools, and it is fine to keep them that way. However, there are situations 
where the human-machine interaction could be improved by having machines 
naturally adapt to their users. Affective computing expands human-computer 
interaction by including emotional communication together with appropriate means 
of handling affective information. Neurological studies indicate that the role of 
emotion in human cognition is essential; emotions are not a luxury. Instead, 
emotions play a critical role in rational decision-making, in perception, in human 
interaction, and in human intelligence. These facts, combined with abilities 
computers are acquiring in expressing and recognizing affect, open new areas for 
research. The key issues in “affective computing,'' (Picard 1999a) [14] computing 
that relates to, arises from, or deliberately influences emotions. New models are 
suggested for computer recognition of human emotion, and both theoretical and 
practical applications are described for learning, human-computer interaction, 
perceptual information retrieval, creative arts and entertainment, human health, and 
machine intelligence.  Scientists have discovered many surprising roles played by 
human emotion - especially in cognitive processes such as perception, decision 
making, memory judgment, and more. Human intelligence includes emotional 
intelligence, especially the ability to a accurately recognize and express affective 
information. Picard suggests that affective intelligence, the communication and 
management of affective information in human/computer interaction, is a key link 
that is missing in telepresence environments and other technologies that mediate 
human-human communication.  (Picard-Cosier 1997) [25] discusses new research 
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in affective intelligence, and how it can impact upon and enhance the 
communication process, allowing the delivery of the more natural interaction that is  
critical or a true telepresence. 
5.Planning 
  The visual field is represented by visual objects connected with agents carrying 
information amongst objects about the field, and carried onto intelligent trees for 
computation. Intelligent trees compute the spatial field information with the 
diagram functions. The trees defined have function names corresponding to 
computing agents. Multiagent spatial vision techniques are introduced in (Nourani 
1998) . The duality for our problem solving paradigm (Nourani 1991a,95a,95b) is 
generalized to be symmetric by the present paper to formulate Double Vision 
Computing. The basic technique is that of viewing the world as many possible 
worlds with agents at each world that compliment one another in problem solving 
by cooperating. An asymmetric view of the application of this computing paradigm 
as presented by the author and the basic techniques were proposed for various AI 
systems(Nourani1991a).  
5.1TheIM_BIDModel 
The co-operative problem solving paradigms have been applied ever since the AI 
methods put forth by Hays-Roth  et.al. [14,35]. The muliagent multi-board 
techniques are due to the author (Nourani 1995a). The BID model has to be 
enhanced to be applicable to intelligent multimedia. Let us start with an example  
multi-board model where there multiagnt computations based on many boards, 
where the boards corresponds to either virtual possible worlds or to alternate visual 
views to the world, or to the knowledge and active databases. The board notion is a 
generalization of the Blackboard problem solving model (Hays-Roth 1985), (Nii 
1986). The blackboard model consists of a global database called the blackboard 
and logically independent sources of knowledge called the knowledge sources.   
Agents can cooperate on a board with very specific engagement rules not to tangle 
the board nor the agents. The multiagent multi-board model, henceforth abbreviates 
as MB, is a virtual platform to an intelligent multimedia BID agent computing 
model. We are faced with designing a system consisting of the pair <IM-BID,MB>, 
where IM-BID is a multiagent multimedia computing paradigm where the agents 
are based on the BID model. The agents with motivational attitudes model is based 
on some of the assumptions described as follows.  Agents are assumed to have the 
extra property of rationality: they must be able to generate goals and act rationally 
to achieve them, namely planning, replanting, and plan execution. Moreover, an 
agent's activities are described using mentalistic notions usually applied to humans. 
To start with the way the mentalistic attitudes are modulated is not attained by the 
BID model. It takes the structural IM-BID to start it. The preceding sections on 
visual context and epistemics have brought forth the difficulties in tackling the area 
with a simple agent computing model. The BID model does not imply that 
computer systems are believed to actually "have" beliefs and intentions, but that 
these notions are believed to be useful in modeling and specifying the behavior 
required to build effective multi-agent systems. The first BID assumption is that 
motivational attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, intentions and commitments are 
defined as reflective statements about the agent itself and about the agent in relation 
to other agents and the world. At BID the functional or logical relations between 
motivational attitudes and between motivational attitudes and informational 
Agent Planning, Models, Virtual Haptic Computing, and Visual Ontology 7
 
attitudes are expressed as meta-knowledge, which may be used to perform meta-
reasoning resulting in further conclusions about motivational attitudes. If we were 
to plan with BID with intelligent multimedia the logical relations might have to be 
amongst worlds forming the attitudes and event combinations.  For example, in a 
simple instantiation of the BID model, beliefs can be inferred from meta-knowledge 
that any observed fact is a believed fact and that any fact communicated by a 
trustworthy agent is a believed fact. With IM_BID, the observed facts are believed 
facts only when a conjunction of certain worlds views and evens are in effect and 
physically logically visible to the windows in effect. Since planning with IM_BID 
is at times with the window visible agent groups, communicating, as two androids 
might, with facial gestures, for example (Picard 1998). In virtual or the “real-world” 
AI epistemics, we have to note what the positivists had told us some years ago: the 
apparent necessary facts might be only tautologies and might not amount to 
anything to the point at the specifics. Philosophers have been faced with challenges 
on the nature of absoulte and the Kantian epistemtics (Kant 1990) [25], (Nourani 
1999a) [45] for years. It might all come to terms with empirical facts and possible 
worlds when it comes to real applications.  A second BID assumption is that 
information is classified according to its source: internal information, observation, 
communication, deduction, assumption making. Information is explicitly labeled 
with these sources. Both informational attitudes (such as beliefs) and motivational 
attitudes (such as desires) depend on these sources of information. Explicit 
representations of the dependencies between attitudes and their sources are used 
when update or revision is required.  A third assumption is that the dynamics of the 
processes involved are explicitly modeled. A fourth assumption is that the model 
presented is generic, in the sense that the explicit meta-knowledge required to 
reason about motivational and informational attitudes has been left unspecified. A 
fifth assumption is that intentions and commitments are defined with respect to both 
goals and plans. An agent accepts commitments towards himself as well as towards 
others (social commitments). For example, a model might be defined where a agent 
determines which goals it intends to fulfill, and commits to a selected subset of 
these goals. Similarly, an agent can determine which plans it intends to perform, 
and commits to  selected subset of these plans.  There are two component: 
goal_determination and plan_determination.  
5.3 VR Computing and Computational Illusion 
The IM Morphed Computing Logic for computing for multimedia are new 
projects with important computing applications. The basic principles are a 
mathematical logic where a Gentzen[25] or natural deduction  systems is defined by 
taking arbitrary structures and multimedia objects coded by diagram functions. 
Multimedia objects are viewed as syntactic objects defined by functions, to which 
the deductive system is applied. Thus we define a syntactic morphing to be a 
technique by which multimedia objects and hybrid pictures are homomorphically 
mapped via their defining functions to a new hybrid picture. The logical language 
has function names for hybrid pictures. The MIM Morph Rule - An object defined 
by the functional n-tuple <f1,...,fn> can be Morphed to an object defined by the 
functional n-tuple <h(f1),...,h(fn)>, provided h is a homomrphism of abstract agent 
signature structures [35]. The MIM TransMorph Rules- A set of rules whereby 
combining hybrid pictures p1,...,pn defines an Event {p1,p2,...,pn} with a 
consequent hybrid picture p. Thus the combination is an impetus event. A 
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computational logic for intelligent languages is presented in brief with a soundness 
and completeness theorem in [28]. The preliminaries to VR computing logic are 
presented since Summer Logic Colloquium 1997, Prague. 
Theorem 5.1  Soundness and Completeness- Morph Gentzen Logic is sound and 
complete.   
Proposition 5.1 Morph Gentzen and Intelligent languages provide a sound and  
complete logical basis toVR.  
A virtual  tree, or virtual proof tree is a proof tree that is constructed with agent 
languages with free Skolem functions. In the present paper we also instantiate 
proof tree leaves with free Skolemized trees. Thus virtual trees are substituted for 
the leaves. In the present approach, as we shall further define, leaves could be 
virtual trees. By a virtual tree we intend a term made of constant symbols and 
Skolem functions terms A plan is a sequence of operations in the universe that 
could result in terms that instantiate the truth of the goal formulas in the universe. 
That is what goes on as far as the algebra of the model is concerned. It is a new 
view of planning prompted by our method of planning with GF-diagrams and free 
Skolemized trees. It is a model-theoretic view. The planning process at each stage 
can make use of diagrams by taking the free interpretation of the possible proof 
trees that correspond to each goal satisfiability. The techniques we have applied 
are to make use of the free Skolemized proof trees in representing plans in terms of 
generalized Skolem functions. In planning with G-diagrams that part of the plan 
that involves free Skolemized  trees is carried along with the proof tree for a plan 
goal.  Proofs can be abstracted by generalizing away from constants in the proof. 
Thus, such a generalized proof can be defined by a whole class of minimal 
diagrams.  This process is usually realized via partial deduction, which can be 
regarded as the proof-theoretical way of abducing diagrams whose littorals are 
necessary conditions for the proof.  By not requiring the proof-tree leaves to get 
instantiated with atomic formulas, we get a more general notion of a proof. The 
mathematical formalization that allows us to apply the method of free proof trees 
is further developed and applied to theorem proving. Existentially quantified 
diagrams carry a main deficit- the Skolemized formulas are not characterized. 
Hilbert's epsilon symbol may be applied to solve this problem. Now we present the 
notion of a predictive diagram and apply it to provide a model-theoretic 
characterization for PD and related proof trees.  A predictive diagram for a theory 
T is a diagram D[M], where M is a model for T, and for any formula q in M, either 
the function f: q → {0,1} is defined, or there exists a formula p in D[M], such that 
T U {p} proves q; or that T proves q by minimal prediction. By viewing PD from 
predictive diagrams we could define models for PD from predictive diagrams- thus 
a model theoretic formulation for PD emerges.  We then define Hilbert models to 
handle the proof-model problems further on. The idea is that if the free proof tree 
is constructed then the plan has a model in  which the goals are satisfied. The 
model is the initial model of the AI world for which the free Skolemized trees 
were constructed. Thus we had stated the Free Proof Tree Sound Computing 
Theorem.  
Theorem 5.2  For the virtual proof trees defined for a goal formula from the G-
diagram there is a canonical model satisfying the goal formulas. It is the canonical 
model definable from the G-diagram.  
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Proof <overview> In planning with generic diagrams plan trees involving free 
Skolemized  trees is carried along with the proof tree for a plan goal. The idea is 
that if the free proof tree is constructed then the plan has a model in which the 
goals are satisfied. Since the proof trees are either proving plan goals for formulas 
defined on the G-diagram, or are computing with Skolem functions defining the 
GF-diagram, the model defined by the G-diagram applies. The model is standard   
canonical to the proof.  
Theorem 5.3 The Hilbert's epsilon technique implies there is a virtual tree model 
M for the set of formulas such that we can take an existentially quantified formula 
w[X] and have it instantiated by a Skolem function which can answer the 
satisfiability question for the model.  
Proof  Follows from the definitions.   
6. Conclusions  
A basis to haptic computing and visual ontology is presented applying multiagent 
computing, morph Gentzen logic, and the IM_BID model.  Specific paradigms are 
introduced and mathematical conclusions are reached on the computational 
properties, visual ontology, and haptic computing pragmatics.  Implications are that 
the techniques will allow us to mathematically structure the processes and achieve 
specific deductive goals.   
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